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SUMMARY OF MAIN EXPERIENCES OF THE PARTY IN ITS WORK AMONG NATIONAL MINORITIES DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS

Approved and Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1954

中央批發关于过去几年内党在少数民族中進行工作的主要經驗总結

（英文）

GENERAL OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

中共中央办公厅印

SUMMARY
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Note by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: The Central Committee herewith issues to you a copy of the "Summary of Main Experiences of the Party in Its Work Among National Minorities During the Last Few Years," adopted at the National Conference on the United Front Work in July 1953. This document sums up systematically the main experiences of the Party in dealing with the national question in the last few years, and gives a correct explanation of the Party's task and policy on the national question during the period of transition to socialism. The Central Committee has endorsed this document and hopes that you will study it carefully and carry out what is summarized in it in accordance with the different conditions prevailing in the areas concerned.

While this document was being revised, some Party committees sent telegrams to suggest that it would be desirable if the document could also sum up experiences in production and economic work in the national minority areas. The Central Committee thinks this suggestion is correct, but at present it still lacks systematic data on the conditions of production and economic work in the

national minority areas. It therefore wishes that the various Party bureaus and sub-bureaus of the Central Committee, and the Party committees of the various provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions concerned should proceed to make the necessary summaries of the conditions of production and economic work among the minority people in their respective areas, and that they should send their summaries to the Central Committee so that it may study and sum them up.

This note and the summary may be issued to local Party committees of the county level and above; and in the army they may be generally issued to Party committees of the divisional level and above. In the case of troops stationed in the national minority areas, they may be issued to Party committees of the regimental level and above. All Party cadres concerned should be organized to read and study the note and the summary. Both documents may also be published in Party publications.

On August 9, 1952, the Central People's Government promulgated the General Programme of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities, along with other documents. Subsequently, on August 23, the Central Committee instructed the Party committees in the various areas concerned to launch a movement among the local Party organizations and cadres for the study of the Party's policy towards nationalities. On September 16 the same year, when transmitting a report by the Tinghsi Regional Party Committee of Kansu Province made after an investigation of the implementation of the national policy in Talachih Township, Chingyuan County, the Central Committee instructed the Party committees in all areas concerned to make similar investigations. Later, on December 16, when transmitting a report by the Yen-

pien County Party Committee of Sikang Province made after an investigation of the implementation of the national policy in that county, the Central Committee again issued an instruction that the implementation of the national policy should be investigated even in areas with relatively small, or very small proportion of minority people. Soon afterwards, most of the areas concerned throughout the country successively began such investigations. Up to now, except for a small number of areas in which they are still going on, the investigations in most such areas have been, in the main, concluded. The Central Committee has already received 192 reports on the implementation of the national policy from various local Party committees: eight from greater administrative areas, 46 from provinces, 51 from administrative regions, 75 from counties and 12 from municipalities.

The findings of this investigation as to how the policy towards nationalities has been implemented fully demonstrates the complete necessity and correctness of the Party's task and policies in relation to the national question in China, and of the principles and measures for work among the different nationalities, in their different conditions, as laid down by the Central Committee and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. In the last few years, we have achieved great and outstanding successes in dealing with the national question, and have made a good start in this regard.

In many areas, the national policy laid down by the Central Committee has been, in the main, correctly carried out, thus laying a good foundation for future work. But, in the course of carrying through this policy, many mistakes and defects have also cropped up. The mistakes made are particularly serious in certain areas where the Central Committee's policy towards nationalities has not been observed.

The experiences and lessons which various local Party committees have themselves summed up also serve to

show that where they have correctly understood the momentous bearing of the national question on the cause of national construction and local political life, and where they have correctly carried out the Party's policy towards nationalities, there the nationalities have been able to achieve equality, unity, mutual trust and cooperation, and the Party committees have made great achievements and accumulated much experience in their work among the nationalities. This was the case with most of the areas, although even there the work has not been altogether free from mistakes and defects.

Where the Party committees have failed to gain a clear understanding of the national question, and have failed resolutely to implement the Party's policy towards nationalities, there, in spite of some achievements in work among the nationalities, the bond of equality, unity, and mutual trust among the nationalities has not been really established. In these places, the Party committees are not well informed of the local conditions, lack mature experience, make mistakes continually, and have many defects in their work. Such was the case with some other areas. In still other areas where the Party committees did not attach sufficient importance to the national question in the past, and proved indifferent to the fact that the national minorities still suffered from discrimination and hardship, the problem is very serious and there are very few achievements in work to speak of. Following the investigation, certain Party committees in these areas could not help being greatly shocked by the large number of serious problems it revealed, and have therefore begun to pay more attention to the national question than they did before. Even now, however, there are some areas, where Party committees, individual Party departments in charge of united front work and some economic and cultural and educational departments still pay no serious attention to the national question. This is shown by the fact that these units

attached no importance to the investigation of the implementation of the policy towards nationalities, made no serious efforts to conduct such an investigation, or even, in some cases, made no investigation at all. Such a state of affairs must not be allowed to go on.

This investigation of the implementation of the policy towards nationalities has brought to light several incorrect views on the national question and exposed several mistakes in the implementation of the policy as well as in the way of thinking and style of work, especially the serious error of great-Hanism which, as pointed out by the Central Committee, still exists among quite a few Party members and cadres. It has also gathered together many experiences of importance and positive significance in the implementation of the policy towards nationalities. A summary of our main experiences follows:

I. THE PARTY'S TASK WITH REGARD TO THE NATIONAL QUESTION DURING THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

What is the task of the Party with regard to the national question following the founding of the People's Republic of China, the liberation of the various nationalities, and the consequent complete elimination of national oppression? It is as follows: to consolidate the unity of the motherland and the solidarity among the various nationalities, so that they can all join hands in building up the big family of our great motherland; to safeguard the equality of the various nationalities within this united, big family in the enjoyment of all rights, and to put into practice regional autonomy for nationalities; in the advancement of the common cause of the motherland and in close co-ordination with its construction, gradually to bring about the political, economic and cul-

tural development of various nationalities (including necessary social reforms at a sure and steady pace), eliminating the actual inequality among the nationalities which has been left by the past, so as to enable the backward nationalities to catch up with the advanced nationalities in the transition to socialism.

But many comrades within our Party have failed to understand the Party's task regarding the national question during the period of transition and have overlooked the importance of this factor. They erroneously think that, following the complete elimination of national oppression, the national question no longer exists, and that it has ceased to acquire new content. Or they erroneously believe that in areas with a large national minority population the national question exists and must therefore be attended to, while in areas with a small national minority population the national question no longer exists and there is no need to give it attention. Some people even say that the national question is an outcome of our own work among the nationalities, and of our propaganda about the policy towards nationalities. All the trouble, they say, is of our own seeking.

The reason why we must safeguard equal status and equal rights for all the nationalities, and why we must use every means to eliminate the remnants of national estrangement and discrimination left over from history, is that we want to achieve unity, co-operation and mutual trust. We must unite all the nationalities, consolidate the unity of the motherland in a common effort to build up our country. We must strive to get the various minority people living in the vast border lands to take an active part in national defence, so as to safeguard our motherland. Under the leadership of our Party, it would be irrational, unlawful and intolerable to allow national discrimination to continue to exist in the People's Republic of China. We must gradually do away with it. The continued existence of national

estrangement and discrimination within our country is undoubtedly most detrimental to the interests of the people of all nationalities, while it benefits the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries, from whom such estrangement and discrimination were inherited. As a result of our efforts to carry out the policy of national equality, and gradually to eliminate such estrangement, the unity of our motherland and the solidarity and co-operation among its nationalities have in fact been further strengthened and developed. It means that we have made lasting and long-range gains in this regard.

We want to have regional autonomy for the nationalities because that is our Party's basic policy for the solution of the national question in China. In the past, the imperialists and Kuomintang reactionaries, in pursuance of their policy of national oppression, deprived the national minorities of the right to autonomy and prevented them from setting up their own government. We, however, regard regional autonomy for the national minorities as essential, so that they have their own governmental institutions and the right to administer their own internal affairs. This is a most striking contrast. It shows that we fully trust the national minorities, and that all the nationalities are able to trust one another and co-operate with one another on this basis.

On the subject of autonomy as applied in the Soviet Union, Stalin said:

> "Three years of Soviet policy on the national question in Russia have shown that in applying Soviet autonomy in its diverse forms the Soviet Government is on the right path, for this policy alone has made it possible for it to open the road to the remotest corners of the border regions of Russia, to arouse to political activity the most backward and nationally diverse masses and to connect these masses with the centre by the most varied ties—a problem which no other government in the world has solved, or has

even set itself (being afraid to do so!). . . . But no matter what aspect the administrative map of the future Russia may assume, and no matter what shortcomings there may have been in this field—and some shortcomings there certainly were—it must be acknowledged that by undertaking an administrative redivision on the basis of regional autonomy Russia has made a very big stride towards rallying the border regions around the proletarian centre and bringing the government into closer contact with the broad masses of the border regions."[1]

Stalin's remarks are of great importance for understanding the significance of carrying out regional autonomy for nationalities in China today.

As a result of our efforts in this direction, we have in fact changed the relations between the Central People's Government and the nationalities who have carried out regional autonomy. This is shown, first of all, by their deep love and whole-hearted support for Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party and the Central People's Government; by their warm love for the motherland; by their trust in the Han people and their confidence in the motherland's construction. And they themselves have actually begun to effect a change in their political, economic and cultural life. This is something unprecedented.

Suppose we did not act in this way. How, then, could we establish and consolidate the connection and relations between the Central People's Government and the various national minorities in the border regions? How could we build up mutual trust among the nationalities? How could we enable the national minorities who live in compact communities to exercise their rights in

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[1]J. V. Stalin: *The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia* (1920), from *A Collection of Articles on the National Question.*

all fields? What facts could we cite to convince or refute those with a tendency towards national secessionism, and frustrate secessionist intrigues by the imperialists? How can we enable the backward nationalities in their present stage of development gradually to catch up with the advanced ones so that they, too, may develop into socialist nationalities? Obviously, none of these goals can be attained without carrying out regional autonomy for nationalities.

We are helping the national minorities to develop politically, economically and culturally, and to improve the livelihood of their people because it is still impossible for them to attain these ends by relying solely upon their own conditions and strength, despite the fact that they have won equal rights. It is true that at a time when large-scale economic construction in our country has just started and a solid foundation has not yet been laid for socialist industrialization, the state cannot as yet devote too much effort to helping the national minorities to achieve rapid economic and cultural growth. But, given the present situation and conditions of the national minorities, it is nevertheless possible, and indeed obligatory, for us to help them undertake certain construction work in the political, economic and cultural fields, particularly to do our best to help them improve agriculture and stock-breeding, and step by step, to improve the livelihood of the minority people. When we have more resources at our disposal, we should help them more.

It is not fortuitous that we are doing this. All the more, it is not because we want to curry favour with persons of the upper strata of the national minorities, or "bring round" certain individuals among the national minorities. We feel duty-bound to do it for the real interests of the minority people and for the common, long-range interests of our country and its various nationalities. We are doing it also in the interests of the

working class and, as regards the Han people, in the interests of the Han people themselves.

Engels said: "No nation which oppresses others can itself be free." Lenin too said:

> "To be an internationalist Social-Democrat one must not think only of one's own nation, but must place the interests of all nations, their general liberty and equality, above one's own nation. In 'theory' everyone agrees with this, but in practice an annexationist indifference is displayed. Herein lies the root of the evil."[1]

It is beyond doubt that the interests of the working class and of the working people of all nations are identical, and that the interests of the Han people and the minority peoples are identical. Without liberating the entire people, the working class itself can never achieve liberation. Suppose that, living in the same big family of the motherland, the minority people see that construction in the areas of the Han people is developing by leaps and bounds and the material life of the Han people improves, while nothing is undertaken in the national minority areas and their own material life is not bettered in any degree—because they themselves lack the means, and we offer them no help—how can we expect them, in such a case, not to come forward with the criticism that the state has been indifferent to them (we have frequently heard such complaints from the minority people) or expect them to contribute with full confidence to our national construction?

Stalin said:

> "The labouring masses of these nationalities are not in a position to make adequate use of the rights they have won, owing to their cultural and economic backwardness. . . . For that very reason

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[1] V. I. Lenin: *Marx-Engels-Marxism.*

the victorious proletariat of the advanced nations must assist, must render assistance, real and prolonged assistance, to the labouring masses of the backward nations in their cultural and economic development, so as to help them to rise to a higher stage of development and to catch up with the more advanced nations. Unless such aid is forthcoming it will be impossible to bring about the peaceful co-existence and fraternal co-operation of the toilers of the various nations and nationalities within a single world economic system that are so essential for the final triumph of socialism."[1]

Stalin's directions are quite clear, and the brilliant examples of how the Soviet Union has solved its domestic national question are known to us all.

We are carrying out all sorts of social reforms in the various national minority areas, particularly the land reform in the agricultural areas of the national minorities which are still in feudalism, because, in order to change the old society in all its aspects, it is essential and inevitable that productive forces should be released from the bondage of the old social systems under which the minority people have been living. For the thorough liberation of the national minorities, it is not enough merely to have national liberation and equality and the aid of the advanced nations, but social reforms are also necessary, for, without them, the mass of the working people among the national minorities can, in the end, never enjoy complete and thorough liberation from oppression. In such a case, society could not forge ahead and the transition to socialism would be impossible.

In carrying out work in the national minority areas, especially in dealing with the problem of social reforms, our Party has all along adopted the principle of going

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[1]J. V. Stalin: *Concerning the Presentation of the National Question.*

forward cautiously and steadily. But this does not mean that we are not prepared to help the minority people carry out social reforms or that we do not want to do anything along this line. Nor does it mean that we want arbitrarily to postpone social reforms. That is because we must take into consideration the following facts: that social development in national minority areas has generally fallen behind that in areas inhabited by the Han people, some of the national minority areas still preserving very primitive social systems; that the relations among the nationalities are very complicated; that revolutionary forces have not yet grown up in their ranks, and it is not easy for them to grow up; that the political consciousness of the great part of the masses is still in its embryonic stage; that social and religious leaders still exercise considerable influence over the masses; that our Party has not sufficiently investigated or studied the socio-economic structure of the various national minorities; and, above all, that should we once make serious mistakes in our work it will be difficult to correct them and still more difficult to repair the damage and regain trust. We are justified in pursuing the policy of advancing cautiously and steadily. It is the policy we have to follow. We will stick to it in future.

Up to now, land reform has been completed in those national minority areas where the socio-economic structure is identical with that of the Han areas. In those national minority areas where the socio-economic structure is on the whole similar to that of the Han areas, but not completely identical with it, land reform has already been carried out among the majority of the population and will soon be carried out among another part. We are not yet ready to carry it out only among a small part of the population there. In the national minority areas where the socio-economic structure is different from that in the Han areas, little or nothing has been done in the way of social reforms, the only

exception being the stock-breeding areas in Inner Mongolia where social reforms have been carried out. Like the Han areas, the national minority areas which have undergone social reforms and land reform are now in the period of transition to socialism. As for the national minority areas where little or nothing has been done in the way of social reforms, we must consider carefully how to carry them out hereafter so as to enable such areas also to advance towards socialism.

In the last mentioned areas, the socio-economic development is more backward and in certain cases society has not yet split up into classes. In other cases where a class society has come into being, serfdom and the dictatorship of priests and nobles still exist, or even the system of slavery. Even in those areas where the socio-economic structure has, on the whole, been similar to that of the Han people, production still lags far behind. Since the social and religious leaders in such areas still enjoy rather high prestige, the masses continue to support them. Because it will take a long time to awaken these masses and because it is difficult for revolutionary forces to develop among them, it is also difficult for us to lay a foundation for our work. Since the areas referred to are sparsely populated and, with a few exceptions, located in the vast border regions, and are not in close contact with the Central People's Government, imperialist-inspired secessionist activities are still going on there, and separatist tendencies among national minorities arise now and then.

With regard to the introduction of social reforms in such areas, we think it advisable to abandon the method of violent class struggle such as has been adopted in the areas of other nationalities, and instead to employ more peaceful means; to proceed, that is, by a circuitous route and more gentle measures, so as to enable such areas to advance and develop very steadily and smoothly. Judging from the conditions in such areas, and especially

from the needs of the whole country in the period of construction, it is more advisable to act in this way. At the same time, because of the favourable internal and international situation, and the ever-growing prestige and power of control which our Party and army have in such areas, it is entirely possible for us to do so. Following the entry into such areas of our Party and our army which have done whatever work could be done there in the political, economic and cultural fields —the old society there could not but begin to change, and the old system could not but be weakened.

On the one hand, under the control and leadership of our Party and army and of the People's Government, we should try to win over and unite with all members of the upper strata who can be won over or united with. We should stick to the policy of uniting and cooperating with them for a long time to come. For this purpose, we are prepared to spend some money to provide them with a living, so that we can win their concessions and support in the matter of social reforms and lead them to advance with us step by step. Here it should be emphasized that it is in fact possible to remould members of the upper strata of the national minorities, and that we should strive to remould the majority of them.

On the other hand, we must gradually develop the revolutionary forces (including the armed forces of the local nationalities and of the working people), augment the new, progressive factors gradually and continually through political, economic, cultural and educational work of various kinds, and carry out the democratization of government in such areas.

After working in this way for some time, we shall be able to create a new situation, in which people of the upper strata will feel obliged to agree to the abolition of old systems, such as feudal serfdom, and to the establishment of new systems, such as the distribution of

land among peasants. Such changes will be effected by government decrees from above. This will still be class struggle and nothing else. It will not constitute reformism or the granting of special favours. But it will be class struggle in another, more tactful form. If we do this, judging from the experience gained in several areas, members of the upper strata will follow us; they cannot choose but follow us. Nor will it cause too great a shock. The few who remain stubbornly hostile will certainly be isolated. We suggest, therefore, that the Central Committee consider the adoption of this principle of carrying out reforms, step by step, in national minority areas of the kind described. Once this principle is fixed, comrades working in these areas will be clearer on many policies and methods, and will be able to direct the work there systematically, in a planned way, and with a set purpose, instead of groping in the dark and vacillating in indecision.

With respect to the national minority areas where class society has not yet come into being, or where the class distinctions are not very clear, they too will directly but gradually advance to socialism together with us after the necessary work has been done.

Some people among national minorities, including some members of our Party, lack a proper understanding of the Party's task concerning the national question in the transition period. They do not know the correct answers to many problems, nor do they understand them with complete certainty. This is only natural, since the work of various kinds that we have done in the different areas is insufficient, flaws and errors still exist, propaganda and educational work on the national question and policy are far from adequate and the various classes among the national minorities suffer from limitations in their understanding.

But that they cherish a deep love for Chairman Mao Tse-tung and place trust in him is a fact widely

established. What they still have doubts about at present is whether, in this big family of the People's Republic of China, the minority people can have real equality, change the conditions that have made them unequal in actuality, and enjoy national development and the improvement of the people's livelihood like the Han people (this problem has been largely solved in Inner Mongolia).

For the solution of this problem we need to do more propaganda and educational work among the minority people at large, or we can wait to let the facts of historical development speak for themselves. As for our Party members, however, we must seek to raise the level of their political consciousness and of their understanding of Marxism-Leninism, so as to enable them to answer such problems themselves and to strive with confidence and resolution for the fulfilment of the Party's task on the national question. Failure to understand these problems correctly may lead to all kinds of wrong tendencies in their outlook: for example, the tendency to drift away from the motherland and the central authorities, the tendency of "autonomy in isolation," and the passive wait-and-see attitude. These are very undesirable.

It is of great importance that our Party should take a serious view of any such state of affairs, for it is a sign that the minority people are not yet entirely satisfied with us, and do not have full confidence in us, because certain work that should and could have been done has not yet been done. Therefore, in order to consolidate unity and continue to develop our work among the minority people, we must not feel satisfied with our present work and our past achievements. We must not rest content with the fact that we have established the autonomous regions, corrected certain mistakes made in the course of carrying out the policy towards the nationalities, and criticized the ideas of

great-Hanism, although all this work is of vital importance and cannot be dispensed with. We must perform our work in the autonomous regions still better and in real earnest. We must within the next few years render some really outstanding service for the benefit of the national minorities, the national autonomous regions and all their labouring people. We must study how to carry out construction and develop production among the minority people and in the national autonomous regions. We must, in compliance with the directive of the Central Committee on "Some Proposed Principles Concerning the Five-Year Construction Plan in National Minority Areas" issued on December 7, 1952, through planning and systematic work, and in the light of the conditions and urgent needs prevailing among the minority people, try to secure some definite results in the political, economic, cultural and educational fields, in public health, in the training of revolutionary cadres, and in helping the minority people hitherto devoid of written language to create one.

For the present, the work of helping the minority people develop production should be brought to the forefront. In the past year or two, many Party committees in the areas concerned have done much work, and have achieved some good results, in helping the minority people develop agriculture and stock-breeding. But there are others who have not paid enough attention to this question. From now on, all Party committees in the areas concerned should strive to do more work and to do it better, always taking into consideration the conditions among the given minority people, so as to ensure a steady development of agriculture and stock-breeding among them. In areas where conditions permit, every possible effort should be made to develop transport, communications and local industry.

II. SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE POLICY TOWARDS NATIONALITIES

1. ON CARRYING OUT REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR NATIONALITIES

Among the larger national autonomous regions established in various parts of China up to May of this year, one is of the sub-province level, 10 are of the administrative-region level, and 35 are of the county level. In addition, there is the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the largest and the earliest established. Work for the establishment of other autonomous regions for nationalities is now going on in various parts of the country.

Our experience proves the superiority of the system of regional autonomy for nationalities. The work we have done to carry out regional autonomy has also, in general, been sound. All this has been incorporated in a preliminary summary made by the Third (Enlarged) Conference of the Central Commission on Nationalities Affairs held not long ago, and has been approved by the Central Government.

We had already set about establishing a number of autonomous regions before the promulgation of the General Programme of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities. Work at that time was marked by signs of undue caution and of timidity in instituting regional autonomy among the minority people. Afterwards such signs became much less, but a tendency to perform the task perfunctorily and in a slipshod manner replaced them in some areas. For example, certain areas did not regard the establishment of autonomous regions as the central task of the day, calling for the concentration of their efforts, but put it on an equal footing with other work, such as the re-check on land reform, taxation, and epidemic-prevention. They did not undertake the

necessary preliminary exchanges of views and consultations, nor did they do adequate work in propaganda and education. The result was that some autonomous regions were established out of close connection with the fervent political aspirations and the great enthusiasm which the respective minority people had cherished with regard to autonomy. Their establishment was not a really conscious and voluntary political movement on the part of the mass of the people and the leaders who maintained close contact with them. So when some autonomous regions were set up, many of the minority people concerned did not even know it. This way of doing things was described by some areas in their self-criticisms as "Put up the signboard, and go through the motions." Actually it was a manifestation of lack of adequate attention to, or even of half-hearted acceptance of, the Party's policy on regional autonomy.

Apart from the above, in some border regions, there were cases in which objectives of work were set too high, being formulated in disregard of the actual circumstances at the place. In a few other areas, an attitude of passiveness and procrastination was discovered, without making active efforts to bring about the conditions necessary for the establishment of regional autonomy. Both attitudes were wrong.

At present the most outstanding and also the most serious problem that is generally found in a number of autonomous regions is that the Han cadres take everything into their own hands, while minority cadres hold positions without the authority that goes with it. Not a few Han cadres lack the proper respect for the minority people's rights in the management of their internal affairs, rights which are theirs as masters of the house. Some Han cadres have even seriously violated such rights. "The minority people are the masters of the house, but the Han people are in real control." This complaint from a number of autonomous regions ex-

pressed most tersely and pointedly the serious nature of this monopolizing attitude of the Han cadres.

Also prevalent is disrespect for the religious beliefs, traditions and customs and other peculiarities of the minority people. In a number of autonomous regions, though the minority people have their own written languages, these are not yet being used as media of official communication, and the use of minority languages has met with restriction and discrimination in government bodies of autonomous regions.

A number of people's governments of the higher level do not have sufficient respect for the rights of the autonomous regions. In particular, they do not give real help to the minority people in the exercise of their autonomous rights. The financial rights of these autonomous regions, as a matter of fact, have not been put into effect. Some people's governments of the higher level have even virtually refused to regard the national autonomous governments below them at the administrative-region level as organs of state power. They pass down orders, assign work and transfer cadres directly to the government bodies below the autonomous organs without going through the latter. So such autonomous regions have come to call themselves, discontentedly, governments "devoid of authority, money or power." Their enthusiasm and initiative has thus been very much dampened. This practice has done serious harm to the Party's policy on national regional autonomy, and has given rise to dissatisfaction among the minority people concerned.

What is the cause of all this? It is partly due to great-Hanism and its survivals which are still to be found in some of the Han cadres. But chiefly it is because many of our comrades, and even a few of the leading cadres, while carrying out the Party's policy of regional autonomy for nationalities, have failed to realize that only through regional autonomy for nationalities

can the national question in our country be gradually solved. They do not understand that the function fulfilled by this policy can never be fulfilled by anything else, and that regional autonomy for nationalities should therefore never be regarded as an empty declaration, a mere promise on paper to the minority people, but should be honestly put into practice. It is also because many comrades do not understand in particular the most essential and central question concerning this policy of regional autonomy, namely, the question of the right of nationalities to self-government and the question of national character.

Stalin said at the Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region in 1920:

> "The autonomy of which we are speaking here is to be understood to mean that all governing bodies should be staffed with your own people, who are familiar with your language and your manner of life. That is the meaning of autonomy. Autonomy should teach you to stand on your own feet—that is its aim."

Later, in 1923, Stalin said in his Report on National Factors in Party and State Affairs:

> "It is necessary that not only the schools, but all institutions and all bodies, both Party and Soviet, should step by step be made national in character, that they should be conducted in the language that is understood by the masses, that they should function in conditions that correspond to the manner of life of the given nation."

From this it is clear that to make the autonomous organs national in character is the central issue in the policy of regional autonomy. Suppose that, in a certain area where regional autonomy has been announced, work is not placed mainly in the hands of local national

minority personnel, but monopolized by the Han cadres. Suppose that, in the same area, the written language (if there is one) and spoken language of the nationality is not used in the autonomous organs as a medium of official communication, and only the written and spoken language of the Han people is used. Suppose that the national folkways are not respected and employed but despised and brushed aside (naturally not all such folkways are beneficial to the development of the national minority concerned, but the preservation or reform of national folkways should be left for the minority people themselves to decide). And suppose finally that the autonomous rights of the nationality are not put into effect according to law, but instead restricted or even abolished. In such a case, could we still speak of regional autonomy for nationalities? The result would be that we would neither win the trust of the minority people nor teach them "to stand on their own feet." It is precisely this vital question that many of our comrades fail to understand, to which they fail to pay enough attention and this has been the source of their many mistakes.

It is therefore absolutely necessary for the Party committees in the areas concerned to make a serious study of the Party's policy on regional autonomy for nationalities, to correct their shortcomings and errors, and to strive, step by step, to make the autonomous organs national in character. For the present, they should see to it particularly that an end should be put to the monopolizing style of work on the part of the Han cadres, so that the minority people may be taught "to stand on their own feet" in the shortest possible time.

It must be pointed out that the task of making the autonomous organs national in character, step by step, is inseparable from another task, that of strengthening leadership over the autonomous regions by both the

Party and the people's governments of higher levels. It is also inseparable from the assistance rendered by Han cadres, or of other nationalities, and from the support given by the Han people and the other nationalities of China. It would be wrong to think that since the minority people are "masters of their own house" and since the autonomous organs should be made "national in character," there is no need for much leadership by the Party; or that Party members in responsible positions can be allowed to assume leadership only if they are of the local minority origin, while their leadership is not needed if they are of the Han or some other Chinese nationality; or that the unified laws, decrees and regulations of the state need not be observed; or that there is little need for following the unified leadership of the Central People's Government or the leadership of the people's governments of higher levels. (In some autonomous regions Party and government organs become one and the same thing, Party organs sometimes even taking over the functions of the government. This is also wrong and should be set right.) It would also be wrong to think that the help and support given by the Han people and cadres are no longer needed. All such views are obviously mistaken and should be carefully guarded against.

2. ON LAND REFORM IN THE NATIONAL MINORITY AREAS

Land reform has been carried out during the last two years in most of the agricultural districts inhabited by minority people. Among about two-thirds of the rural population of national minorities, land reform has already been completed or is now in progress, while among the remaining one-third land reform has not yet begun. Our Party has acquired a good deal of experience in land reform in these areas. Even though land reform in the remaining areas will not be carried

out in the way it was done in the past, it is still necessary and worth while to sum up our experience in this field.

Under what conditions can land reform be carried out? According to past experience gained in various places these conditions are: (1) peace and order in society; (2) normal relations among the nationalities; (3) thorough investigation and study, and correct analysis of the economy and class relationships in that area; (4) a desire for land reform on the part of the bulk of the minority people concerned; (5) consent by leaders maintaining close contact with their people and by social figures at large, and the internal unity of the said minority people; and (6) the existence of backbone revolutionary cadres and experienced working personnel from the ranks of the national minority concerned. All these six requirements must, in the main, be met. None can be left out. Besides general policies on land reform, the other policies to be followed and the methods to be adopted should be well defined. Certain policies should be made perfectly clear to the cadres, the masses and the upper strata of the national minority. According to past experience in various places, these may be summed up under seven main headings:

(1) Prior to land reform, united front work should be done well among members of the upper strata and among the clergy who maintain contact with the people. Everything possible must be done to get them to support land reform or at least to remain neutral. This must be achieved before mobilizing the masses. The two steps must not be reversed in order.

(2) The area of attack should be reduced to a minimum. Persons of the upper strata and the clergy who are in close touch with their people should be given due consideration, and provided with a way out. All those with whom we have united, or with whom we

should unite, must be given due protection during the land reform.

(3) When land is distributed, the Party leadership must exercise strict control so that the methods adopted will be mild, steady and appropriate to the situation. Personal violence should be prohibited and arrests restricted, and no one should be killed if it can be helped (death sentences necessary in serious cases of counter-revolution should not be carried out during the land reform).

(4) In carrying out the work, reliance should be placed on local national minority cadres. Han cadres and other outside cadres should not monopolize their work or take it over.

(5) Land and buildings belonging to the monasteries and other places of worship of the minority people, and other public land and buildings connected with religious beliefs, local traditions and customs, should in principle, and in the main, be left untouched. If the masses demand otherwise, and persons of the upper strata and the clergy agree, the matter may be reconsidered. To avoid possible incidents in this connection, Party committees of the higher levels in the areas concerned should, at the beginning of land reform, make separate provisions for dealing with land and buildings of this kind in accordance with the conditions among the local nationalities, and exercise strict control. Any forced redistribution is wrong.

(6) In areas inhabited by several nationalities special attention should be paid to relations between them. When conducting struggles against landlords of one nationality, peasants of the same nationality should play the principal part and cadres of the same nationality should assume leadership. When redistributing land, buildings and other property, we should especially see to it that there be an equitable distribution among the nationalities.

(7) Land reform should not be carried out in areas where agricultural production and stock-breeding exist side by side. To make sure that land reform in agricultural areas does not cause alarm and loss to the nearby pastoral areas, the policy of "Neither struggle nor redistribution; benefits for both livestock-owners and hired workers" should be publicized as far as possible in the latter. Intensive efforts should be made to develop stock-breeding in the pastoral areas. This should also be the principal task in mixed pastoral-agricultural areas, but agriculture there should also be given due consideration. In pastoral areas and mixed pastoral-agricultural areas, land reclamation should in general be prohibited and pastures protected. Land reclamation should not now be extended into the pastoral and mixed pastoral-agricultural areas of the minority people. If land reclamation is to be carried out there in the future, that should be done by the minority people themselves. For Han people to reclaim land in national minority areas, the approval of the bureau of the Central Committee or of the Central Committee itself is required.

Experience in various places shows that wherever the above principles have been strictly observed, land reform work has, in general, been sound and smooth. Otherwise, mistakes, even serious ones, have occurred. Some of the mistakes made in the past in areas where land reform has been completed have now been corrected. Others must be remedied at the time of the recheck on land reform or after it. Especially worthy of notice is the mistake, which occurred in many places, of deliberately alloting less land, inferior land, or even no land at all to the peasants of national minorities. Such mistakes have led to new cleavage and mistrust between the working people of Han nationality and those of other nationalities who were affected, and must therefore be completely remedied. Mistakes should be frankly admitted before the minority people, and ways

of readjustment should be sought so far as possible to ensure to each peasant of the minority a share of land to which he is entitled. Failing that, proper compensation should be made through other means. Even in the case of the landlords of the minority people, to allot them less or inferior land, or no land at all would still be a mistake, which must be corrected. Only by so doing can we expect to bring about real unity among the labouring people of all nationalities, and win the trust of the labouring people of national minorities for our Party. This is a vital question, to which the Party committees in the areas concerned must pay close attention.

3. ON THE BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY AMONG THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

Chairman Mao Tse-tung said, in a directive issued in November 1949 on work among national minorities in Northwest China, "Without large numbers of communist cadres of national minority origin, a final solution of the national problem and complete isolation of the reactionaries among the various nationalities is out of the question." This shows that Party-building and the training of Party cadres from among national minorities is of vital importance to the solution of the national problem.

Experience gained by our Party over a long period of time in its work in some national minority areas, and particularly its experience gained in many such areas in the last three or four years, has fully proved the correctness of this directive. Wherever, in the national minority areas, Party members have been recruited from the local national minorities and cadres have been trained from their midst, it has often been relatively easy for us to carry on our work and to take root. Otherwise, both are difficult.

To make the organizations (including Party organs) in the national minority areas take on a national character is a very important component of our Party's policy towards nationalities. However, it takes a comparatively long time to make the leading Party organs national in character. In some national minority areas, it even takes a very long time; nevertheless, we must be resolute and tireless in our efforts in this direction.

At present, except in certain areas where the Party organs have already taken on a national character, or where possibilities for this exist already, there are, in most areas, still too few Party members of local national minority origin, or even none at all. Especially lacking are Party members of long standing. It is therefore completely necessary in such areas to form Party organs composed entirely or mainly of Party cadres of Han nationality, so as to give effect to Party leadership and to undertake the work of building and developing the Party. But in all places where there are Party members of the local nationality, no matter how few they may be, serious efforts should be made to train cadres from among them, draw them step by step into the Party organs to take part in ordinary work or the work of leadership. In this way the Party organs will, as a result of sustained and arduous efforts, gradually assume a national character.

In places where there are no Party members of the local nationality, or where their number is very small, the Party committees concerned must attach importance to the development of Party organizations, and with due consideration for local conditions, carry on the work of recruiting Party members from among the national minorities in a more planned and systematic manner. They should also carry on work among the youth (the organizational forms of which may be varied), and on that basis recruit Youth League members so as to create conditions for the development of the Party and other

revolutionary forces. In areas where we set our foot not long ago and where our work has not yet been placed on a firm foundation, such as Tibet, Golo, etc., it is not advisable, for the time being, to recruit Party members from the local population at large, though personnel of local nationalities working in our organizations, army units and schools may be admitted into the Party individually.

Our national minorities are backward politically, economically and culturally. Many of them do not even have their own proletariat. Thus, in recruiting Party members from national minorities, we cannot for the time being apply the standard for Party members—the eight qualifications—in the same way as in areas inhabited by the Han nationality. Rather, we should take into account the actual conditions of the national minorities and admit into the Party those active elements whose personal histories are clear, and who are politically reliable, who support the Party loyally and are willing to work actively for the Party. After they have been admitted, education and assistance should be given them so that gradually they can meet the eight qualifications for Party members. Otherwise, Party-building among national minorities would be almost impossible.

In recruiting Party members from among national minorities in various places, the questions that often arise are: Should minority people, who have a fair level of political understanding, but who still fail to measure up to a relatively high level of internationalism, be admitted into the Party? Should people who believe in religion be admitted into the Party?

No nationalism, be it great-Hanism or the local nationalism of national minorities, is compatible with communist principles, that is, with Marxist-Leninist principles. Communism and nationalism are hostile to each other. A communist stands for internationalism and national equality; he opposes national oppression and

carries on uncompromising struggles against it. The Communist Party ceaselessly carries on Marxist education within the Party and among the people, in order to overcome both great-Hanism and local nationalism. Party members, first and foremost, are required to overcome any nationalist ideology which is incompatible with internationalism. Just as Party members of Han nationality must overcome the ideology of great-Hanism, so Party members of the national minorities must overcome the ideology of local nationalism. However, it does not follow that we should demand of every Party member of national minority origin that he be a perfect internationalist when he joins the Party, for that is impossible. Local nationalism is a historical legacy of long standing, and is primarily an outcome of the protracted system of national oppression. To eliminate such a legacy requires not only that national equality be realized in respect of all rights; it also calls for the removal from every aspect of life of traces and influences left over from national oppression, such as estrangement, suspicion, misgivings among the nationalities, and so on.

This demands, on the one hand, the social systems of the various national minorities be remodelled along the people's democratic line. On the other, particularly at present, taking the country as a whole, efforts should first be made to overcome the ideology of great-Hanism among the Han people, and first and foremost among cadres of Han nationality. To wipe out local nationalist ideology, therefore, is a serious and complicated problem; a hard job that requires enduring patience. This is true outside the Party as well as within.

Thus, in recruiting Party members from among the national minorities, the best ones among them who are politically up to the requirements for Party membership should be admitted even though they still have certain shortcomings in ideology; and after they have been admitted into the Party appropriate education should be

given them so that they will be able, while being steeled in prolonged revolutionary practice, to overcome, step by step, the remnants of local nationalist ideology. The Party should demand that Party members from national minorities regard the overcoming of local nationalist ideology as one of the important tasks in their own constant political and ideological schooling, and that they work tirelessly towards this goal. At the same time, however, care should be taken not to mix up their ordinary expressions of national sentiment with local nationalism; and precautions should be taken against assuming a mistaken attitude in dealing with the question of national sentiment among such Party members. Of course, those seriously infested with local nationalist ideology should not be admitted into the Party; otherwise, it would also be a mistake.

There are many national minorities in our country among whom the belief in Islam or Buddhism is widespread and deep-rooted, and there are also people who believe in other religions. This differs greatly from the situation prevailing among the Han nationality. The politically conscious elements among the labouring people and the revolutionary intellectuals of national minorities support the Party and work for it honestly, in accordance with its calls and directives. Politically speaking, they are already qualified for admission into the Party, but on the other hand, they keep more or less to their religious beliefs. Under such circumstances, if renunciation of religion were to be made a condition for admission into the Party, our Party-building work in many national minority areas would be almost impossible.

It is rather difficult, moreover, to find out whether or not a person has renounced religion. Comrades working at the lower levels often resort to tests to ascertain whether or not religious belief has been abandoned. For instance, the person concerned may have

been asked prior to his admission into the Party to make an oath before the organization that he has renounced his religious belief; or in the case of a Party member who originally believed in Islam, he may even have been asked to eat pork, and so on. Such erroneous practices have already occurred in some areas and confronted the Party organizations there with the danger of divorcing themselves from the people of national minorities.

Of course, in proclaiming religion to be a matter of freedom of belief for the individual, we are referring to the country as a whole and absolutely not to the Communist Party itself, or to Marxism-Leninism. There must be absolutely no ambiguity about this fundamental principle. But those politically conscious elements among the labouring people and the revolutionary intellectuals of these nationalities, who, while still keeping their religious conviction and sentiments, have nevertheless accepted the Party programme and Constitution, and who in practice have actually and actively done work in accordance with Party calls and directives, should be admitted into the Party, after they have been tested and tried. And renunciation of religion should not be made a condition for their admission. After such new comrades have been admitted into the Party, they should be given assistance gradually to weaken and discard their religious beliefs after a long period of inner-Party education and revolutionary practice. The habits of life of Party members of national minority origin (such as not eating pork and so on), whether they are connected with religious belief or not, should, in general, not be interfered with, but should be respected. Party members of a national minority consisting universally of believers in some religion (such as the Hui, Tibetan or Uighur nationality) should be advised not to divorce themselves from the great majority of their nationality in matters of religious ritual and habits of life.

Professional clerics of national minorities (such as the Living Buddhas and Great Lamas of Lamaism, leading personages of Islam, Imams, Mullahs, etc.) should, as a rule, not be admitted into the Party. In individual cases, those among them that are qualified for Party membership may be admitted after a strict examination and with the approval of a Party committee not lower in rank than that of a province, municipality directly under the central authority, or autonomous region. After they have been admitted, special attention should be given to their education, but with them, too, renunciation of religious belief should not be made a condition for admission into the Party. As regards other people of the upper social strata of national minorities, the question of their admission into the Party should be dealt with in accordance with the same principle.

4. ON THE TRAINING OF CADRES FROM AMONG NATIONAL MINORITIES

Our Party has always attached great importance to the training of cadres from among national minorities. In the last three or four years, owing to the fact that our Party has persistently carried out the policy of training large numbers of such cadres on an extensive scale, and of employing and promoting them boldly, the number of full-time cadres from national minorities, working at various levels in all parts of the country, has now reached some one hundred thousand. Apart from a number of veteran cadres trained by our Party over a long time, the great majority are active elements who have emerged since the liberation from various mass movements, and trainees from the various institutes and schools for nationalities, cadres' schools and short-term training classes who have afterwards been promoted. In addition, we have united extensively with persons of the upper social strata of the various nationalities who maintain close contact with the people; and enlisted the ser-

vice of such persons. These national minority cadres are a most precious asset to our Party, as well as to the people of the various nationalities.

The chief problem now confronting us in our work of training national minority cadres is this: The number of cadres in many national minority areas, and especially of leading cadres of the county level or above, is still too small to meet the needs of the work; moreover there are hardly any cadres, and none at all in many areas, who have any specialized skill. Hereafter, in training cadres from among national minorities, stress should be laid on raising the level of cadres on the job, and on the planned fostering and training of specialized technical personnel, and first and foremost working personnel at the primary level. The best cadres of national minority origin should be promoted boldly to leading posts of various kinds and at various levels. Within each nationality, we should pay attention to the training and promotion of local cadres from different districts.

We should enthusiastically help all cadres trained from among national minorities, so that they may be able to succeed in their work and establish their prestige. We should also educate them, constantly and patiently. Should they commit mistakes, we should educate them over and over again so as to help them rectify such errors. We should not discredit them or dismiss them at will. It should be appreciated that the growth of new forces within a national minority is not a very easy matter. As regards persons of the upper social strata with whom we have achieved unity, and who have contact with their people, proper account should be taken of their traditional influence, of their special roles and the likelihood of their progressing, and we should keep them in our ranks for a long time to come.

To meet the needs arising from the unfolding of our work in the national minority areas, we have dispatched tens of thousands of Han cadres of various levels to these

areas from time to time. These cadres, during the last few years, have familiarized themselves with local conditions, established definite connections with the local national minority people, and accumulated a certain amount of experience in work; some, moreover, have learned the languages of the local nationalities. Although they have been working under very arduous and difficult conditions, they have never relaxed their efforts, and during the last few years they have made great achievements. Some cadres who committed mistakes in their work were nevertheless able, with a few exceptions, to rectify them and do good work afterwards. It is very natural that they should be ardently welcomed by the people of the various nationalities.

Cadres of Han nationality sent to national minority areas should play a more effective role rather than grow to large numbers. In future, the dispatch of such cadres should be based on the principle of "better fewer but better." This will also be beneficial to the growth and promotion of cadres from among the local nationalities. With respect to Han cadres who have already been sent to the national minority areas, appropriate measures should be taken to effect a serious improvement in their political and cultural life, and in their material well-being. They should be encouraged and educated in every way to "feel at home, take root, blossom and bear fruit" in the areas where they work, and should not be transferred lightly from one place to another. Outstanding cadres and deeds of merit in work concerning national minorities should be commended and awarded in time, so that the problem of disinclination to remain at their present posts, a fairly widespread attitude among Han cadres in the national minority areas, may be solved effectively. Those who have discredited themselves and disgraceful conduct should also be dealt with in a serious and timely way; and in grave cases due punishment should be given. This too is essential.

The relations between cadres of Han nationality and those of local nationalities have generally been good. Such good relations must continue to be consolidated and strengthened. There can be only one principle governing the relations between cadres of different nationalities and of the same nationality: that is sincere cooperation and close unity. There can be no other principle.

Personnel administration work in the national minority areas and related regulations have not yet been systematically established. The Party committees concerned, especially their organization departments, should sum up their experiences in this respect, develop this work and work out the necessary regulations as soon as possible, in order to raise, organizationally, our nationality work to a higher plane. Such Party committees and their organization departments should pay special attention to the training of on-the-job cadres of national minority origin on a rotation basis; run the institutes for nationalities efficiently; and train specialized technical personnel, and first and foremost working personnel at the primary level. National minority cadres who do good work should be given opportunities to study; this is worth while even though their absence may have a temporarily adverse effect on the work.

Education for cadres of Han nationality (including responsible cadres) must also be intensified. An important measure that should be adopted for raising the level of such cadres is short-term training (ten days or half a month) in rotation, with emphasis on education concerning the Party's policy towards nationalities, combined with the summing up of experiences in work. Party committees in the areas concerned should strive, in a planned and systematic way, to enable all cadres of Han nationality to receive such training by turns within a definite period.

5. ON UNITED FRONT WORK AMONG PERSONS OF THE UPPER SOCIAL STRATA OF THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

Persons of the upper social strata and religious personages among national minorities, who have close contact with their people, generally enjoy a certain degree of prestige and influence among the masses of their nationalities. The masses look upon them, more or less, as their own representatives as well as the representatives of their respective nationalities. Unity with such persons is beneficial to our work among the masses, and thereby facilitates the gradual settlement of both the national problem and the social problem. This is especially true in areas where the political, economic and cultural situation is more backward; where persons of the upper social strata and religious personages have great prestige and influence among the masses; where a rapid growth of revolutionary forces among the local people is not possible; where existing estrangement between the nationalities, inherited from history, is still rather serious; and where religious influence is still fairly widespread and deep-rooted. Under these circumstances, if we did not make a point of winning over persons of the upper social strata and religious personages, it would be very difficult or even impossible for us to carry on work among the masses, nor would it be possible to stabilize social order. Therefore, considering the present stage of development of the national minorities, we must adopt an extensive united front policy, be energetic in carrying on the united front work among persons of the upper social strata and religious personages, and win over and unite with as many of them as possible. Those whose winning-over may seem optional, should all be won over; those with whom unity may seem optional, should all be united with. As regards those persons of the upper social strata and those religious personages with whom we have already achieved

unity, we must stick to the idea of long-term co-operation with them, and of assisting them to advance. We must educate and help them to reform themselves step by step. We must oppose the idea of "uniting with them today and knocking them down tomorrow." This will facilitate our work of winning over the masses of the people of national minorities, and uniting with these masses.

During the last three or four years, most of the Party committees concerned have spared no effort in carrying out united front work among persons of the upper strata of national minorities. In the local or higher government organizations of various areas, for instance, they have offered positions, as far as possible, to many persons of the upper social strata who maintain close contact with their people. They have taken their economic interests into account, consulted with them on problems which in one way or another affected them, educated them in patriotism and various policies towards nationalities, organized visits to Peking and other places and, in areas where land reform and other social reforms were being carried out, protected or looked after those who should have been protected or looked after. This is both beneficial and necessary.

However, there are comrades in some areas who still do not understand that to win over all sorts of persons of the upper strata, who have connections with people in the national minority areas, including even those who are opposed to us, is a prerequisite for winning over the masses and doing our mass and other work. They have the mistaken notion that, in the national minority areas, they can go straight ahead and do mass and other work effectively without having to win over and unite with those persons of the upper strata who enjoy a certain prestige, or even high prestige, among the masses, and without reaching agreement and understanding with them. In areas where such com-

rades work, cases have occurred where unity was not reached with those with whom we should have united, where protection was not given to those who should have been protected, and where proper positions were not given to those who should have had them. Of more common occurrence is the adoption of a perfunctory attitude towards those persons of the upper strata who have already been properly placed, failing to consult them on matters or show proper respect for their authority, unwilling to assist and educate them patiently so that they may be able to make some achievements in work, and progress step by step in their political level. These shortcomings and mistakes have even reached a very serious degree in certain areas, and it is imperative that the Party committees of the various areas concerned pay attention to them and make all possible efforts at rectification.

On the other hand, in our work among the Hui people in certain areas the slogan "Everything through the Imam" was raised. This is a mistake of another kind. Although it has been corrected, we must beware of it in our future work.

The united front work among persons of the upper strata of national minorities is a very complicated affair. Generally speaking, persons of the upper social strata and religious personages of national minorities have misgivings and apprehensions of varying degrees about us; they are apt to vacillate, and succumb easily to the instigations of enemy agents and counter-revolutionaries. Care should therefore be taken to use suitable methods, principally in connection with the actual work in the respective national minority areas and the construction of the motherland, to carry on among them regularly the kind of political and patriotic education which they can comprehend and accept, to explain to them clearly the policies of the Party and the People's Government which need to be

explained, and to endeavour to get them to come ever closer to the People's Government and follow our lead. It is also necessary to make proper criticisms of their mistakes. But such criticisms, it should be noted, are to be made only under favourable conditions and in an appropriate way. Erroneous, over-simplified, impatient ways of conducting struggles must be avoided and corrected.

6. ON THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

Most national minorities of our country have religious beliefs. Among these, Islam and Buddhism are particularly widespread and deep-rooted among many national minorities, being followed by almost the entire population of these nationalities. In areas inhabited by such national minorities, religion is not merely a matter of personal belief; it is an integral and important part of the entire national question. As the Central Committee has pointed out in its instructions to the Working Committee in Tibet, disrespect for religious beliefs would impose upon us a passive role, while respect for religious beliefs enables us, to a great extent, to have the initiative politically. Therefore, with regard to the question of religious belief, we must adopt a very cautious attitude over a long period of time, resolutely carrying out the policy of the freedom of religious belief and refraining from the erroneous practice of interfering with religious affairs by giving administrative orders. The experience of the past three or four years shows that it is entirely correct and necessary to adopt the above-outlined policy on the question of religions of the national minorities.

In some areas, however, cases of vacillation and impatience have occurred in the carrying out of the policy, and this has led to trouble. For instance, the mistake of opposing the Imams was made in Sinkiang at one

time. Infringements upon the freedom of religious belief of the Hui people occurred repeatedly in many inland areas where the Hui and Han nationalities live side by side. Mistakes were also committed in certain areas of the Mongolian and Tibetan nationalities, where the lamas were forced to secularize and a dead-line was set for their secularization. These mistakes occurred mainly because many of our cadres, and even individuals among the leading cadres, were not quite clear about the stand of our Party on the question of religion; and particularly because they lacked due understanding of the special features with regard to the religions of national minorities.

Communists are atheists and materialists, and do not believe in religion. But the method used by the Communist Party to draw the mass of the working people away from religious beliefs is not interference by administrative orders; it relies chiefly on the development of political, economic, cultural and educational work, and on the carrying out of social reforms, to weaken the influence of religion naturally, in an indirect and roundabout way, and stage by stage. Any over-simplified or rash way of dealing with the matter is wrong.

As Lenin has taught us, ". . . The fight must be linked up with the concrete practical work of the class movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion." Lenin seriously criticized the practice of atheistic propaganda of the "down with religion" kind, refuting it as "a superficial view and narrow, bourgeois culturism." This is because "fear created the gods,"[1] which are a manifestation of mankind's appeal to mysterious forces in the face of natural and social forces which it could not understand and considered to be

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[1]The phrases quoted here are from "The Attitude of the Workers' Party Towards Religion," *Marx-Engels-Marxism* by V. I. Lenin.

irresistible. Thus rudimentary religious ideas took shape in primitive societies and became systematic religions in class societies, and religions developed considerably through their use by the exploiting classes.

Since that is how religion was born and grew, the elimination of religion is possible only when mankind has eliminated classes and greatly developed its ability to control the forces of nature. This requires scores of years, at least, in our country. The fact that religious activities are still allowed in the Soviet Union, now in transition from socialism to communism, fully shows that religion has a long life.

In addition to the more backward character of the societies of the national minorities, national oppression, carried out for a long period in the past, was another factor favouring the widespread and profound belief in religion among many national minorities, and making it possible for Islam and Lamaism to become the faith of all the people among many national minorities. Under national oppression, the religious beliefs of national minorities were also discriminated against; they had no freedom in this respect either. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why in their past struggles against national oppression, many national minorities often raised the banner of "safeguarding religion," and used religion as an important cord to unite their own nation. This national character of the religion among national minorities is quite plain.

It should also be noted that great numbers of other people in the world believe in Islam and Buddhism. Except in the Soviet Union, in China and other People's Democracies, Islam and Buddhism are, in the main, religions followed by the people of the Asian and African countries. Our country's policy towards Islam and Buddhism, therefore, will have great influence on them. This is something we must pay attention to and cannot overlook.

The above are the reasons why we must adopt a very cautious and respectful attitude towards the religions of national minorities. It is because they lack understanding of the long life and the national and international aspects of the religions of national minorities as explained above, that some comrades, in a number of places, made mistakes of impatience and rashness. These comrades thought that religion could be eliminated to a great extent merely by launching several powerful anti-religious propaganda campaigns. Some comrades even regarded land reform as a good opportunity to eliminate religion, and therefore, in the course of land reform, they publicized opposition to "Allah" and to religious superstitions. By doing this, they not only failed to eliminate or weaken religion, but made the local national minorities feel that their religious sentiments were being repressed, and thus further consolidated their faith.

Of course, much of the political, economic and cultural work we have done in the national minority areas, and especially the social reforms, have naturally played a part in weakening religion indirectly. It would be wrong not to see this. Furthermore, we must consolidate and protect the achievements in religious reformation made through the efforts of the people of national minorities, and within the different religions, over a long period in the past. But at the same time, we must persist in the policy of protecting the mosques, lamaseries and other religious establishments of national minorities.

Basing ourselves on what has been said above, we should naturally not adopt a laissez-faire attitude in regard to religion and let it have its own way. What we should do is to carry on our work all the more cautiously. We should carefully develop and foster the growth of certain progressive forces in the various religions, and try as far as possible to win over some of the religious leaders, so that, by efforts over a long period to come,

we can gradually bring the religions of the national minorities under control. But we must take the greatest possible care not to let certain of our measures with regard to religion result in the expansion of its influence, and provide favourable conditions for the religious circles to fool the masses.

7. ON THE HANDLING OF RIOTS IN NATIONAL MINORITY AREAS

A number of riots have occurred in certain areas inhabited by national minorities in the last three or four years. Among those which were comparatively large in scale, and which affected relatively wide areas, were the incident in the Chiencha area of the Tibetan nationality in Chinghai, the Kazakh incident on the Sinkiang-Kansu-Chinghai border, the incident in the Hsichi area of the Hui people in Kansu, the incident in the Heishui area of the Tibetan nationality in West Szechuan, the incident in the Tibetan nationality area on the Szechuan-Kansu border, and the incident in the Liangshan area of the Yi nationality on the Szechuan-Sikang-Yunnan border. These riots broke out mainly because of the instigations of the remnant bandits and enemy special agents and other counter-revolutionaries, but also because of shortcomings in our own work in these areas — in individual areas, there were serious shortcomings and mistakes — and these were taken advantage of by enemy agents and counter-revolutionaries. All these incidents have now been properly settled.

With regard to riots in the national minority areas, we must adopt the policy of striving for a political settlement while making adequate preparations for military measures (such preparations are necessary and indispensable).

Riots in the national minority areas, naturally, are inseparable from the activities of persons of the upper

strata of national minorities; but they often take on a national or mass character. They cannot be regarded as ordinary banditry, nor can they be considered as counter-revolutionary revolts in the usual sense. Therefore, riots in the national minority areas should not be handled as questions of ordinary banditry, or as counter-revolutionary revolts, but should principally be dealt with as a national question. Except for special cases, we should primarily use political methods, trying repeatedly to win over the participants in the riot, to effect its disintegration, and to strive for peaceful settlement. This is because military suppression will readily aggravate national estrangement, which arises easily but is hard to dispel.

But adequate military preparations are extremely necessary. Otherwise it would be impossible to carry out political work effectively, still less to win victory at one stroke when we are forced to resort to arms. We must also envisage the possibility of a situation in which, if troops are not used at the outset, it would be difficult to put down the riot successfully and would lead to greater danger. In such a case, troops should be used at once. But generally speaking, we must try as far as possible to keep our troops in readiness and not use them. When we are forced to resort to arms, or when we do so after the repeated failure of our efforts to win over the participants in the riot by political means, we should still carry on, persistently and tirelessly, the political work of winning them over and disintegrating the riot. We should try every possibility to win over the broad mass of the people and persons of the upper strata of the local nationality concerned; and we should make use of those persons of the upper strata of the local nationality who have co-operated with us to do the work of winning them over. In areas where there are people's armed forces of the local nationality, we should

make use of these forces so as to reach a smooth settlement of the riots there.

Under the above principle, we must carry out a policy of different treatment of different cases. The most important aspect of such a policy is that we must try repeatedly to win over persons of the upper strata of the nationality in question, and adopt a particularly lenient policy towards them. We must deal firm blows and suppress resolutely the counter-revolutionaries who come from outside; but generally we should not deny the chance to turn over a new leaf even to them. As regards the masses in general, we must try our best to win them over, arrange for them to live in peace, and help them to solve their difficulties so that they can settle down to production with their minds at ease, instead of labelling them as "bandits."

In the past, certain areas did not follow such a principle and policy in the beginning but stressed military suppression and overlooked political work, which resulted in the loss of the sympathy of the people of national minorities, and in the recurrence of the riots in spite of the suppression campaign. This is a lesson which should be learned.

In areas where riots have occurred rehabilitation work is very important. Examination of this work should be made seriously and in time, and shortcomings and mistakes corrected thoroughly. Otherwise, even if a riot is put down, loopholes may still be left of which bandits and secret agents can take advantage, and there will still be the danger of the riot recurring. In the event of the recurrence of a riot in a national minority area after it has been put down, we should not only follow the above principle persistently, but should also guard strictly against the sentiments of impetuosity and reprisal which may arise among the cadres.

In case revolts by bandits with long records or by counter-revolutionaries occur in the national minority

areas, although the principle of dealing with them is different from that with regard to the type of riots mentioned earlier, efforts must still be made to get persons of the upper strata of the national minorities to work together with us. When the bandits and counter-revolutionaries are being dealt with after the incident is over, they too should be handled in accordance with the aforesaid principle.

III. RECTIFICATION OF THE IDEOLOGY AND STYLE OF WORK OF GREAT-HANISM, SUBJECTIVISM AND COMMANDISM AMONG SOME HAN CADRES, AND PREVENTION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF LOCAL NATIONALISM

In investigating the implementation of the policy towards nationalities in various areas, not a few shortcomings and mistakes were discovered. The three principal ones are as follows:

1. First of all, great-Hanism or its vestiges exist almost everywhere. Its most serious manifestations are discrimination against the national minorities, failure to treat them in the spirit of equality, and serious infringements on their freedom and rights. Instances of this are disrespect for, or even rude interference with, the religious beliefs, customs and habits, and the spoken and written languages, of national minorities; forcing the minority people to give up national dances and national costumes, to cut their hair, and to refrain from speaking their national languages and from engaging in "yufang"[1]; forcing the Hui people to raise pigs and eat pork; etc.

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[1] "Yufang" is a custom of the Miao nationality in which young men and women select a beautiful place to sing and dance and make love.

In the course of land reform in some areas it was even announced that "anybody who professes to belong to a national minority is sabotaging the land reform," and members of the national minorities were forced to sign statements declaring that they did not belong to national minorities. In the course of land distribution, in some cases, the minority people were purposely given less land, inferior land, or even no land at all. Their crop yields and tax burdens were purposely estimated at a higher rate. In distributing relief funds and granting loans, less funds and loans were purposely issued or granted to them and sometimes they were refused altogether. In addition, there were quite a number of cases in which local government organs showed no concern for the well-being of the people of national minorities. They spent or withheld the special government appropriations for national minorities at their own will, and withheld the ordinary funds allotted them for current expenses when extra subsidies were issued from above. These acts of discrimination against national minorities were comparatively common in areas where various nationalities live together, and in relation to the minority people scattered in different places.

Cases of looking down on national minority cadres, or even of discrimination against them, are also rather common and of a serious nature. Some Han cadres are given to arbitrariness in their work in the national minority areas; some of them even regard national minority cadres as puppets. Quite a number of Han cadres consider national minority cadres as backward, despising and even distrusting them. Some Han cadres, who went to the national minority areas to help the fraternal nationalities in their work, kept "national secrets" from the leading cadres of these fraternal nationalities, refusing to let them learn things which they should know and thus creating serious estrangement. This led the na-

tional minority cadres in some areas to describe themselves as "the ears of a deaf man — an ornament."

There should be no such things as "national secrets." Inside the Party and the government, there should be no national distinction which dictates what a big nationality can be informed of but the national minorities are not to know; or what one nationality can be informed of but the other nationality should not know. Were any such distinction made, it would be impossible to obtain mutual trust and unity. Keeping "national secrets" has in fact become a manifestation of national discrimination and sectarianism. But in opposing keeping "national secrets" we should not become confused as to the need of strictly guarding secrets from our class enemies, or of keeping the secrets of the Party and the state.

Among the government council members in a number of autonomous regions, there are what is called "odd-job council members," and "transport council members," namely, council members who do nothing except cooking, tending horses, delivering messages and doing odd jobs for the Han cadres. In many areas, certain organizations do not want to take in cadres of national minorities, asserting that "it is too much trouble" to have such cadres, or that "national minorities lack the ability to do things." Cases in which national minority cadres were subjected to arbitrary abuse also occurred in some areas.

The national minorities in some areas have complained that "the Han nationality is backed while national minorities are still mistreated," or that "now it is the dictatorship of the Han nationality over national minorities" and so on. All this reflects the discontent and indignation of national minorities with great-Hanism. It shows that great-Hanism has actually become, at present, the major danger in the relations between the nationalities and in our work among national minorities.

The Han nationality, on its part, has a large population with great influence and is in an advanced and leading position. The national minorities, on their part, have small populations with little influences; they are politically, economically and culturally backward and led by others. With such contrasting conditions, it is not hard to imagine what bad effects and consequences great-Hanism is bound to produce among the people of national minorities. Facts have also proved: Wherever great-Hanism exists, there national minorities suffer and feel that they have not yet been liberated; wherever great-Hanism has been, in the main, overcome, there national minorities are in a better position to improve their lives step by step. Where great-Hanism or its vestiges still exist in the leading organizations or among leading personnel of the locality, serious consequences are all the more likely to occur. In fact, it is not merely in individual areas or cases that great-Hanism or its vestiges exist in our local leading organizations or among leading personnel. This should put us on guard all the more.

In the process of this investigation, it was also revealed that local nationalism or its vestiges exist to a considerable extent among national minority cadres. It was further revealed that great-nation chauvinism or its vestiges exist among certain national minorities which constitute the majority in a particular area. We must also educate the national minority cadres in these matters step by step, and help them to rectify such mistakes and prevent their recurrence. The advanced elements in each national minority should undertake the responsibility of criticizing the various forms of the tendencies of local nationalism within their own nationality, and educate the cadres and people of their own nationality constantly to strengthen their unity with the Han nationality, and with the other national minorities.

But if the emphasis is not placed on rectifying and overcoming great-Hanism among Han cadres, we cannot

set a good example to the fraternal nationalities; nor can we correctly and effectively help cadres from the fraternal nationalities to recognize the errors of local nationalism and great-nation chauvinism, and to correct these errors consciously and voluntarily.

2. There has prevailed, rather generally, an air of impatience and rashness and the practice of arbitrarily transplanting experiences obtained in the Han areas. This has done damage to our work in many national minority areas; and in certain cases, it has even caused riots in such areas.

The tendency to impatience and rashness has found expression chiefly in the fact that certain cadres have proceeded with social reforms prematurely, disregarding local conditions. For example, in Sinkiang an attempt was made last year to begin social reform in the pastoral areas, and to eliminate the livestock-owners as a class. And among the Yi nationality in certain areas in Liangshan, our cadres issued orders forbidding the buying and selling of slaves. There are still many examples of this kind. Such rash measures are chiefly due to the subjectivism of certain cadres. They have failed to take note of the actual conditions in the national minority areas, but have acted according to their own wishes. They have failed to act in line with the free will of the majority of the people of the area, but have relied solely on the advice of very few active elements. They have not sought the concurrence of persons of the upper strata of the respective local nationalities before taking any measures, but have left these persons aside unnoticed. They have failed to postpone to a suitable future date what it is impossible to do at the moment, but have tried to accomplish things today which will only be possible to-morrow or even the day after to-morrow. Their approach has not been to help the people of national minorities painstakingly, gradually and over a long

period of time to attain progress and development; instead they have attempted to accomplish too many good things overnight.

The experience of many areas shows that our comrades, when they began work in such areas, were on the whole modest and careful; that they acted according to the Central Committee's policy of advancing cautiously and steadily, and that as a consequence they all soon achieved successes. But before long, some of them grew conceited and self-complacent, became impatient and rash, and as a consequence their work suffered setbacks. Because of lack of sufficient understanding of the complexity of the national question, many of our comrades often overestimated their own successes, laid improper stress on the advantageous conditions under which they worked, and underestimated the disadvantages. Soon after the Hsihaiku incident in Kansu last year, for example, some of our comrades declared that "unity among the nationalities there has now been consolidated," that "no great problems now exist in the relations among the nationalities," and that "the chief problem is now within each national minority itself." Again, soon after the battle of Heishui in western Szechuan, some of our comrades there held that "class contradiction now eclipses national contradiction, and time for land reform has come." But in fact, relations among the nationalities there remained very tense, and the possibilities of land reform were quite remote.

In many areas, the practice of arbitrarily transplanting experiences obtained in Han nationality areas is even more prevalent. This error too is due to subjectivism, and is closely connected with the tendency to impatience and rashness. One of the important and indispensable prerequisites for the development and progress of the fraternal nationalities is to start from the actual needs and possibilities of each nationality in its present

stage of development, and apply appropriately the advanced experience obtained in areas of the more developed nationalities, the Han nationality in particular. Some national autonomous regions, like the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and the Yenpien Korean Nationality Autonomous Region, have accumulated some positive and successful experiences in this respect. They have been able to do so because they have observed the principle of acting on the basis of the actual needs and possibilities of the nationalities concerned in their present stage of development. But in other national minority areas, many of our comrades have either neglected or completely ignored this basic principle. They have been blind to the national peculiarities of the areas concerned. They have not acted in accordance with the actual conditions prevailing in the area, but have arbitrarily transplanted the experiences of the Han areas. They have even imposed the reform measures taken in Han rural areas on the pastoral areas of the national minorities. In setting up autonomous regions, they arbitrarily transplanted a whole set of measures adopted in the formation of peasants' associations during the land reform in the Han areas. They adopted the policies and measures used in the suppression of banditry in the Han areas to deal with riots of a national and mass character among national minorities. Such measures not only made a mess of the work, but aroused the strong antipathy of the fraternal nationalities.

In still other places, the experiences of one national minority area have been mechanically applied to another where the conditions are entirely different; or the experiences obtained in dealing with the majority nationality of a given area have been mechanically applied in dealing with minority nationalities in the same area. In both cases, mistakes were committed.

3. A considerable number of cadres of the primary level resorted to coercion in carrying out their duties, and

serious offences against the laws and discipline were often committed. Coercion has been widely practised in grain collection and taxation; it has been used repeatedly even in the health services, and in matters of trade, banking and loans. The masses, for example, were forced to buy goods, or to get inoculations, or to take loans.

In certain areas, breaches of the laws and discipline were prevalent to an alarming degree. Some of the cadres have made arrests at will, concocted false charges, extorted confession by torture, and caused unwarranted deaths. In the Li and Miao Autonomous Region on the Hainan Island, for example, large-scale campaigns to arrest "Chingmu" were ordered on two occasions. ("Chingmu" are witches traditionally believed to cause disease and deaths.) One of the two cases was in the Third District of the Paoting County, where, under the direction of the acting district chief Fu Fu-chuan, 127 women of the Li nationality were hung up and flogged, with the result that five of them, unable to stand it, committed suicide.

During land reform, too, unwarranted arrests were made, and wanton floggings and other physical tortures, contravening the policy, were frequent in many areas. In the Seventh Village of the Heiku Township, Weining County, Kweichow Province, for instance, over twenty different types of physical torture were used in the fight against the landlords, causing the death of twenty of them (18 of the Yi and two of the Han nationality). Two peasants were also flogged.

In routine work, abuses of power and ill-treatment of the masses were also fairly prevalent. Some of the Han cadres not only swore at the masses and practised physical violence against them; they also did the same to persons of the upper strata of the local national minority. In Yuanyang County, Yunnan Province, for instance, the Han cadres of the united guard team went so far as to arbitrarily execute a Yi of high social standing called Li

Hsi-kung who had just been won over. This had very bad effects.

Acts of coercion and offences against the laws and discipline have been committed chiefly by Han cadres who came from other places to work among national minorities; but some cadres of the local nationality have not been free from them, either. That such things should happen to a serious extent is invariably due to the bureaucratism of certain leading bodies and responsible cadres. They consider the work among national minorities unimportant and show little concern for the well-being of the people of national minorities. They fail to educate the cadres under them in the policy towards nationalities. Unfamiliar with the conditions below, they are contented to sit in their offices, issuing orders and directives which prescribe what is to be done without indicating how it is to be done. They are interested only in whether the tasks are accomplished; they are not interested in the way in which they have been accomplished. On important matters concerning policy they fail to seek instruction from, or report to, the higher level. They sometimes even conceal the facts, report only the good things but not the bad ones, so that many of those who perpetrated coercion and offences against the laws and discipline are not dealt with in time, or are even connived at.

Wherever bureaucratism prevails in the leading bodies or among responsible cadres, it is inevitable that organizations and cadres at the basic level will get things done by commands, and will commit acts of coercion and offences against the laws and discipline. In such cases many difficulties are bound to arise in the relations among the nationalities, and most probably there will be trouble, sometimes great trouble. Conversely, wherever leading bodies pay attention to the work among national minorities and conduct investigations to find out how the policy towards nationalities is being implemented,

and give timely instruction, there the relations among the nationalities are bound to prove more satisfactory and the work to be carried on more smoothly.

In some areas, criticisms have been directed at the leading bodies to the effect that five things are deficient: namely, scale of organization and cadres, funds, interest and support from above, instructions from above, and documents. This may not tally completely with the real situation, but it shows to some extent that those who work at the lower levels have difficulties in such matters. It is a fact that bureaucratism did exist in the work of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Commission on Nationalities Affairs of the Central People's Government. We were not well enough informed of what had happened at the lower levels. We failed to deal with some of the problems in time. We failed to make a sufficient study of important problems peculiar to national minorities affairs. These have been grave defects in our work and efforts must be made to overcome them. Departments concerned under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central People's Government should also correct such shortcomings as paying insufficient attention, or generally no attention at all to work among national minorities.

Great-Hanism is an expression of the reactionary ideology of the landlord and bourgeois classes in relations among the nationalities. It is an ideology of the Kuomintang. The subjectivism shown by some Han cadres in their work among national minorities is closely connected with their great-Hanism. For such personnel it is very easy to fall into the quagmire of great-Hanism. Their intolerable offences against the laws and discipline, in matters concerning relations among the nationalities, originate in essence from the Kuomintang style of work — great-Hanism. After the recent inves-

tigations in various areas, the three errors enumerated in the preceding pages have, in varying degrees, been exposed to criticism and corrected. But greater efforts should be made to solve those problems. For this we must do the following things:

1. It is necessary to whole-heartedly carry on education within the Party, as well as among the people, in Marxism and in the Party's policy towards nationalities in accordance with the instruction issued by the Central Committee in March 1953, under the title of "Directive Concerning the Education Within the Party and Among the People in the Marxist Theory on the National Questions, and the Criticism of Great-Hanism so as to Eliminate the Discrimination and Affliction Still Suffered by Some People Among the National Minorities." It is necessary to seriously criticize the ideology of great-Hanism, so as gradually to free those among Party members, cadres and the people, who entertain views of great-Hanism, from the influence of landlord and bourgeois ideology. Such education should, in particular, be carried out among the cadres, because unless their ideology and viewpoint are correct, it will be impossible for them to give the people a correct education. Criticism of great-Hanism will not only facilitate the elimination of subjectivism, bureaucratism and offences against the laws and discipline in our work among national minorities. It will also facilitate the elimination of the local nationalism among national minorities, and of the great-nation chauvinism among those national minorities which form the majority in the local population. Thus, criticism of great-Hanism is of crucial importance to the rectification of ideology and style of work in the sphere of nationalities affairs at the present time.

The elimination of great-Hanism or its vestiges is a matter of long-term ideological education, but appropriate disciplinary measures must be taken when individual Party members or cadres commit serious mistakes

in this respect. Those who obstinately persist in their mistakes should be removed from their posts and transferred from the national minority areas.

Party publications should give due consideration to publishing articles and news criticizing or exposing great-Hanism. Furthermore, in order to educate Party members and the people, the newspapers should print more articles, making public criticism of great-Hanism on the basis of available facts.

In order to facilitate the education of the people in the policy towards nationalities and in unity among the various nationalities, the experiences of the "Support the Army and Protect the People" movement, launched in the past in the old liberated areas, should be drawn upon. At an appointed date every year, a special and intensive educational campaign on the policy towards nationalities should be organized in all areas concerned. Its purpose should be to encourage and induce both the Han people and national minorities to denounce, by means of self-criticism, their own faults and errors in respect to the relations among nationalities; and to find proper solutions for the problems in this connection. In some areas, spontaneous rallies among the nationalities now take place on certain festival days. These will serve as a start for the measure we have mentioned. The Party committees and the governments in all the areas concerned should pay attention to them. They should be looked into and raised to a higher level, and should be tried out first in certain areas as an experiment. After some experience has been gained, they should be introduced in all parts of the country.

In the struggle against great-Hanism, we should pay attention to fostering the initiative displayed in their work by cadres of Han nationality; we should have the ability to differentiate between comrades who have wrong notions on this matter and those who do not have them, and to differentiate between those who have made

serious mistakes and those who have made only minor mistakes. Those comrades who are free from great-Hanism, who work diligently and seriously in the service of the people of national minorities and have achieved successes should be given proper encouragement and commendation. Outstanding cases should be reported in newspapers. Full assistance must be given to those Han cadres who meet with difficulties in their work. Measures must also be taken to forestall deviations of a different kind, such as pessimism and despair, over-cautiousness, and timidity in shouldering responsibilities, that may possibly arise among Han cadres in the ideological struggle against great-Hanism.

2. It is necessary to carry out systematic investigations and studies in Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question and the Party's policy towards nationalities. This is the basic method of bringing about a correct integration of the Party's policy with the actual conditions of the national minority areas. It is also one of the principal conditions for the correction of mistakes arising from subjectivism manifested in impatience and rashness and in the arbitrary transplantation of the experiences of Han areas or those of the areas of other advanced nationalities. This is especially true since, in nationalities affairs, a host of new problems (for example, there is the problem of how many nationalities, after all, are there in China) have now been raised. Such problems can be solved gradually only after circumspect and systematic investigation and study. The Party committees concerned at all levels, and the related departments under the Party committees, particularly the departments of the united front work and nationalities affairs, must, therefore, begin at once to strengthen their work in this respect.

3. It is necessary that the various departments concerned of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and of the Central People's Government,

as well as those of the local Party committees and governments, pay attention to their own work concerning national minorities, and do their best to make it a success. For this purpose, these departments should, when necessary, appoint special personnel or set up special subordinate organs to take charge of work among national minorities and strengthen its leadership over their subordinate organizations. Where such special organs have already been set up, they should be properly strengthened where necessary.

4. It is necessary that in areas where there are national minorities, the Party and government organizations at all levels, when laying down tasks of all-regional character, or when issuing decisions or decrees of this character, make necessary and appropriate explanations on policy and methods of work in the light of the various conditions of national minorities. Where such explanations have not been made, such decisions or decrees should under no circumstances be applied mechanically in any national minority area.

If the Party and government organizations in any national minority area consider that such decisions or decrees are suited to the actual conditions of the local nationality and are therefore feasible, they should state their reasons, propose practical measures for implementation, and report to the Party committee of the higher level (in more important cases, to the Central Committee). Only after their proposals have been examined and approved, may they implement such decisions or decrees.

If any directive, decision or decree issued by a higher organization concerning the national question does not tally with the actual conditions of certain national minority areas, the leading Party and government organizations there have the power to postpone its implementation. But they should, as soon as possible, report to the Party and government organizations of

the higher level for their approval, or request them to make necessary modifications or supplementations. The same principle holds when a policy or method of work that is applicable to a national minority of an area forming the majority of the local population, as, for instance, the Uighurs in Sinkiang, is applied to other national minorities of the same area.

In inland areas where national minorities are mixed among the Han people, even when the general policies for the Han areas are applicable to the national minorities there, attention should still be paid to respecting their religious beliefs, customs and traditions, and to looking after any special needs and difficulties which may arise in their economic and cultural life.

5. The experience gained in the study of the policy towards nationalities, and of the present investigation of how this policy is being implemented, shows that an effective way to help leading organs discover and solve problems and to educate cadres and to improve work, is for the Party to check on the work and sum up experiences from top to bottom and in typical aspects, in conjunction with the study of policy. From now on, therefore, all leading organs of the Party and the government should consider it a routine task to look into the implementation of the policy towards nationalities and into other affairs in the national minority areas, and to sum up their experience. At present it is urgent and necessary that, in the national minority areas, the departments concerned should make timely investigation of, and sum up the experience in, the Party's organizational work, the training of cadres, propaganda work, and work concerning local industries, trade, health, finance, economics, agriculture, education and institutes for national minorities.

6. Unity is the very life of the Party. In the national minority areas, the consolidation and strengthening of Party unity is the key to success in the work

among national minorities. In doing such work, the principle of seeking instructions from, and reporting to, higher organizations must be strictly adhered to. Disregard of organization and of discipline and departmentalism must be overcome. Whenever there is any question about policy and principles, important plans or other important matters, it is imperative that action be taken promptly to seek instructions from, and make reports to, the bureau or sub-bureau of the Central Committee, or to the Central Committee itself. There should be no violation of this ruling.

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